International Bulletin of Political
Psychology
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 3

8-1-1997

Trends. Can Accountability Be Accountable? General Fogleman
Requests Retirement
IBPP Editor
bloomr@erau.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp
Part of the Military and Veterans Studies Commons, and the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Editor, IBPP (1997) "Trends. Can Accountability Be Accountable? General Fogleman Requests Retirement,"
International Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol3/iss1/3

This Trends is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

Editor: Trends. Can Accountability Be Accountable? General Fogleman Requests Retirement

International Bulletin of Political Psychology
Title: Trends. Can Accountability Be Accountable? General Fogleman Requests Retirement
Editor: Editor
Volume: 3
Issue: 1
Date: 1997-08-01
Keywords: Accountability, Military Personnel, Military
Ultimately military personnel deal with life and death Issues--even if for many of these personnel the
likelihood of the ultimate is very remote. Requiring accountability for these personnel--the taking of
responsibility for one's actions and their consequences--is a sound abstract principle. However, it too
easily breaks down in concrete instances.
A military leader might demand punishment for all--including himself or herself--whenever one's action
or lack of it is followed by noxious consequences. Even recognizing that events occur that are indeed
beyond the control and comprehension of humans, such a leader would at least possess a consistent
policy. One exemplification of this is the common, corrupted Spartan aphorism--"Come back with your
shield or on it." There are no excuses.
Many United States (US) military leaders and their civilian authorities have taken a different tack. They
have attempted to make judicious distinctions about the causal nature of one's action, inaction, and
some consequence. They have also attempted to make similar distinctions about the value and intensity
of the consequence. This is both admirable and consistent common US values. Whether it is the best
way to control a military organization is more controversial.
Today the huge problem for US Air Force accountability is that some military leaders and some civilian
authorities take neither of the two above approaches--although they publicly claim and may privately
believe that they do. Instead they do one of three things. (1) They play politics and seek anything from
mass media visibility, a higher probability of being elected or promoted, greater financial assets, or more
support for their own ideology. (2) They seek some self-psychological effect--catharsis, transcendence,
sacrificing to one's supergo, closure--as resolution of a noxious consequence. (3) They act on the sincere
belief that some people--both spies and counterspies, terrorists and anti/counterterrorists, perpetrators
and perpetratees, the malign and the benign--always are responsible for events. A quote which may
exemplify this approach was cited recently by The New York Times from US Senator Richard Shelby
(Republican-Alabama), Chair, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, concerning the Khobar complex
bombing--"Someone should be held accountable, shouldn't they?"
So, should someone be held accountable for the bombing or--for that matter-- other noxious events in
the world. The easy answer is sure--the spies, the terrorists, the malign who planned, supported, and
perpetrated the act. The more difficult but correct answer is that the counterspies, the
anti/counterterrorists, and the benign are not always by the widest stretch of the imagination
responsible for all events and, therefore, should sometimes not be held accountable. The inquisitors
who venally play politics, narcissistically seek self-psychological effect, and sincerely advocate for the
prepotency of an omnipresent concept are actually subverting accountability's essence and its positive
consequences for military organizations. And in General Fogleman's case, they are accountable for the
loss of a decent man who has been a judicious practitioner of accountability. (See Double, R. (1996.)
Four naturalist accounts of moral responsibility. Behavior and Philosophy. 24, 137-143; Schmid, J., &
Fiedler, K. (1996.) Language and implicit attributions in the Nuremberg Trials: Analyzing prosecutors' and
defense attorneys' closing speeches. Human Communication Research, 23, 371-398; Schmitt, E. (July 29,
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